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FROM THE FRONTLINES OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT TO 
END FORCED ARBITRATION AND RESTORE JURY RIGHTS 
An Essay in Three Parts 
F. PAUL BLAND,* MYRIAM GILLES,** TANUJA GUPTA**
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, groups of people united by a shared purpose have 
achieved transformational changes in the law. Movements for women’s 
suffrage in the early 1900s, black civil rights in the mid-century, and mar-
riage equality in the early 2000s, as examples, began as ideas for change 
expressed through grassroots protests, marches, rallies and petition drives.1
Over time, these efforts gathered force and gained support, eventually lay-
ing the groundwork for precedent-changing lawsuits and historic legisla-
tion. Meanwhile, other reform efforts have had noticeably less success 
penetrating the public consciousness and maintaining momentum. For ex-
ample, Occupy Wall Street,2 Black Lives Matter,3 and the Women’s 
March4 each arose from shocking incidents that incited tremendous public 
fervor and generated countless headlines; and while these movements have 
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 1.  See generally Nan Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Democracy and the Mar-
riage Equality Campaign, 64 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1662, 1665 (2017) (describing social movements that 
“produce change in the law”). 
2.  Occupy Wall Street began in 2011 to protest the misdeeds of the financial industry that led to 
a massive economic meltdown. For two months, protestors occupied a small park in lower Manhattan 
until they were evicted by police. See Sarah Kunstler, The Right to Occupy: Occupy Wall Street and the 
First Amendment, 39 FORDHAM U. L.J. 989, 990 (2012) (describing protest).  
 3.  In 2014, Black Lives Matter started as a protest in Missouri that spread across the nation to 
condemn police shootings of unarmed black people. See Jonathan Capehart, From Trayvon Martin to 
‘Black Lives Matter’, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/wp/2015/02/27/from-trayvon-martin-to-black-lives-matter/. 
 4.  The largest single-day demonstration in U.S. history, the Women’s March on January 21, 
2017, saw 700,000 people pack into the National Mall to protest for female empowerment in the wake 
of Trump’s election. Thousands more marched in demonstrations across the country and the world. 
Matt Broomfield, Women’s March against Donald Trump is the largest day of protests in US history, 
say political scientists, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/womens-march-anti-donald-trump-womens-rights-
largest-protest-demonstration-us-history-political-a7541081.html.   
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left their mark on our culture, none have (yet) resulted in lasting legal 
change.5  The current protest—fueled not just by the killing of George 
Floyd by Minneapolis police officers, but by a pandemic that has visited 
hardship and death with particular virulence on black and brown people—
has problematized issues of systemic bias in ways that may or may not lead 
to real reform. 
How is any movement for legal change created and sustained? Why 
does one movement succeed where another fails? How do supporters trans-
form public discourse and advocacy into meaningful legal change? 
Each of the authors of this essay have tried, in different ways, to en-
gage and sustain a change-making movement to end forced arbitration and 
restore jury rights. These are provisions that companies write into standard-
form contracts with their consumers and employees that require all legal 
disputes between the parties be resolved in one-on-one, private arbitra-
tions.6 These provisions require citizens to forsake procedural rights to a 
fair and open hearing before a jury of their peers.7 And, given the certainty 
that consumers and employees will almost never be able to arbitrate small-
dollar claims individually, forced arbitration provisions promise corporate 
parties virtual immunity from liability.8 Today, millions of citizens are 
subject to these provisions, and as a result, they are routinely denied access 
to public courts and juries of their peers.9
Over the past decade, battles over the legality of forced arbitration 
have been waged all across the nation in courtrooms, legislative chambers, 
and boardrooms, pitting two sets of combatants against one another.10 On 
one side are left-leaning public interest groups, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and 
 5.  See Anna North, 7 Positive Changes That Have Come From the #MeToo Movement, VOX
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/4/20852639/me-too-movement-sexual-
harassment-law-2019 [https://perma.cc/7S6Q-A86S]. 
 6.  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005) (describing forced arbitration). 
 7.  Id.
 8.  Id.
 9.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1028(A), § 2.3 (2015),  
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XBD-G9V7] (reporting that 99.9% of cell phone subscribers, 90% of credit card 
contracts, 98.5% of storefront payday loans, 86% of private student loans, and 84% of prepaid cards are 
all subject to forced arbitration); see also Alexander Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, ECON. POL’Y INST. (2018), epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9L2-ZY3N] (estimat-
ing that over half the country’s nonunionized workforce is now subject to these provisions – over 80 
million workers). 
 10.  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (2016) (describing partisan battles between the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
nonprofit groups over forced arbitration).   
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advocates for consumer and worker rights.11 These legal liberals have long 
relied on access to courts and juries to vindicate important statutory and 
common law rights, as well as to seek effective redress for widespread 
wrongdoing.12 These advocates argue that forced arbitration shuts the 
courthouse door and denies citizens their constitutionally guaranteed rights 
of due process and transparency.13
Political support for arbitration comes from corporations, big-firm de-
fense lawyers, and conservative policymakers who argue that consumers 
and employees benefit from a dispute resolution system that is cheaper, 
faster, and easier than traditional litigation.14 For these groups, whose hos-
tility to the plaintiffs’ bar and class action litigation is well-documented,15
enforceable arbitration clauses offer the power to unilaterally define “cer-
tain types of claims as not warranting a hearing by a judge and jury.”16 In 
this alternative procedural process, companies have written the rules to 
benefit their parochial business interests—i.e., barring class actions, short-
ening statutes of limitation, restricting discovery, requiring complete confi-
dentiality, and prohibiting certain remedies.17 Much of this has been 
enabled by a conservative Supreme Court, which has allowed sophisticated 
legal actors to rewrite the procedural rules that govern the proceedings to 
their own advantage.18
The battles over forced arbitration are deeply consequential and hard-
fought. This essay describes some of these battles from our perspective—as 
 11.  See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (describing efforts by Public Justice and other 
nonprofit groups to eliminate forced arbitration).   
 12.  Id.
 13.  Id.
 14.  See, e.g., The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions Undermine the Rights of Consumers, Workers, and Small Businesses?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Archis Parasharami).   
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-17-13ParasharamiTestimony.pdf. 
 15.  See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2008). 
 16.  SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 41
(2015). 
 17.  See Gilles, Day Doctrine Died, supra note 10. 
 18.  In the past decade, the Supreme Court has decided over a dozen cases upholding forced 
arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017); 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 
25 (2014); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. 
Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012); Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012); 
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); 
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 
561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
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advocates who have litigated, testified and protested in an effort to end 
forced arbitration. 
I. CHALLENGES TO FORCED ARBITRATION: BACKGROUND AND 
CONTEXT
Thirty years ago, an idea was hatched by a group of corporate defense 
lawyers and arbitration marketers. These lawyers were tired of defending 
their corporate clients from “frivolous” class actions brought by entrepre-
neurial plaintiffs’ lawyers, earning staggeringly high fees; and the arbitra-
tion marketers wanted to expand the sale of private dispute-resolution 
services.19 Working together, this brain trust devised a startlingly simple 
idea: rewrite all standard-form consumer and employment contracts to 
require that any disputes be resolved in one-on-one, private arbitral pro-
ceedings.20 In other words, these agreements would contractually prohibit 
class actions and other aggregate litigation, starving entrepreneurial law-
yers of fees21 and shunting all these disputes into arbitral proceedings be-
fore private judges whose livelihoods depend on the repeat business of 
large corporate actors.22  In response to any argument that class-banning 
arbitration clauses might deter small-dollar litigants from individually arbi-
trating their disputes, these corporate lawyers suggested that companies 
offer “bounties” to pay the attorneys’ fees of successful litigants.23
Corporate defenders had some basis for believing their gambit would 
succeed: In the 1980s and 90s, Supreme Court Justices began to interpret 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in new and unexpected ways.24 Enact-
ed in 1925 to promote arbitration among equally sophisticated parties in 
commercial and maritime contracts, the FAA provides that an arbitration 
agreement “written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce” was enforceable, subject 
only to “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
 19.  See Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 6. 
 20.  See Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 05 C. 7116 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleging that 
defendant banks and corporate defense lawyers held a series of secret meetings to discuss and plan the 
implementation of class-banning forced arbitration clauses). 
 21.  See, e.g., Alan Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who’s the Predator? Banks Can 
Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, 7 BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 1998, at 25, 26 (arguing that elimi-
nating class actions would reduce the incentive of entrepreneurial lawyers to sue big companies and 
banks).  
 22.  See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997) (finding that employees prevailed merely 16% of the time against “repeat 
players” firms in arbitration).   
 23.  See Parasharami, supra note 14. 
 24.  See Gilles, Day Doctrine Died, supra note 10. 
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contract.”25 In the early half of the 20th century, arbitration remained a 
niche practice, deployed primarily by business interests seeking to channel 
disputes out of the traditional litigation system and into less expensive and 
more private forms of alternative dispute resolution.26 In these early years, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed its view that the FAA encouraged 
the arbitration of claims between equally sophisticated parties and rejected 
efforts to impose arbitration upon guileless consumers or employees via 
standard form contract.27 In 1953, for example, the Court unanimously 
ruled that claims brought by an investor under the federal securities laws 
could not be forced into arbitration.28
But by the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court began to reinterpret the 
FAA in service of the ideologically conservative goal of allowing corpora-
tions to compel arbitration and eliminate access to courts and juries.29 In 
case after case, the Court gave this statute an increasingly prominent role in 
shaping dispute resolution, applying it to a wide range of disputes far be-
yond what its drafters intended.30 These decisions empowered large corpo-
rate actors to force arbitration on consumers, employees and other weaker 
contractual counterparties lacking the ability to bargain for or even com-
prehend the rights that they were giving up. Over time, arbitration clauses 
have been used to eliminate class actions, shorten statutes of limitation, 
 25.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 26.  See Steven A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 79 
(reporting on the increase of commercial, labor and construction cases arbitrated before the AAA from 
1975 to 1985). 
 27.  See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (“On several occasions [1925 legislators] expressed opposition to a law which would 
enforce even a valid arbitration provision contained in a contract between parties of unequal bargaining 
power. Senator Walsh cited insurance, employment, construction, and shipping contracts as routinely 
containing arbitration clauses and being offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or 
employees.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 28.  Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953). 
 29.  See Gilles, Day Doctrine Died, supra note 10. 
 30.  See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) (holding that the FAA applies in 
state courts and preempts state legislation intended to protect franchisees from unfair arbitration agree-
ments); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985) (announc-
ing “the federal policy favoring arbitration”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1987) (finding 
that the FAA preempted a California law guaranteeing access to courts in wage collection actions); 
Gilmer v. lnterstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (finding that the FAA applies to the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688–89 
(1996) (finding that the FAA preempted a state law requirement that a contract containing an arbitration 
clause include a notification on the first page of the contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (rejecting arguments by twenty state Attorneys Generals in finding that the 
FAA applies to state, as well as federal court); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321, 353 
(2011) (finding that the FAA preempts state public policy from prohibiting waivers of class actions). 
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restrict discovery, and force litigants to waive a variety of rights and reme-
dies.31
Legal academics and liberal judges roundly criticized the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. Some warned that the Justices were divesting public 
dispute resolution of critical transparency and due process values.32 These 
critics worried that denying litigants the right to their day in court and their 
right to a jury of their peers would foster distrust in the rule of law, under-
mining its very legitimacy.33  Others challenged the Court’s interpretation 
of the FAA as historically inaccurate and redolent of an ideological distrust 
of litigation.34 And yet, others cautioned that enforcing arbitration provi-
sions would allow important rights guaranteed by federal and state law to 
simply go unredressed and future rights violations undeterred.35 By the 
mid-1990s, some of the Justices themselves began to sound the alarm.36
Legal challenges to the enforceability of forced arbitration clauses 
commenced immediately. Dusting off state law unconscionability doc-
trines, lawyers like Paul Bland at Public Justice sought to invalidate forced 
arbitration provisions based on the FAA “saving” clause, which provides 
that a party may oppose arbitration on such “grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”37 These early legal clashes set 
the tone for a decades-long battle over the meaning and function of forced 
arbitration clauses. 
 31.  See generally SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL 
RETRENCHMENT 41-46 (2015). 
 32.  See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitra-
tion, 67 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 279 (2004); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The 
Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1958 (1996). 
 33.  Id.
 34.  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The 
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 5, 5 (“Despite its 
constant, talismanic repetition, the ‘national policy favoring arbitration’ is illusory and highly dubious 
federalism.”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institu-
tions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 277 (1995); Jean 
R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitra-
tion: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL L.
REV. 1, 12–13 (1997). 
 36.  See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“There is little doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far beyond 
the expectations of the Congress that enacted it.”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining 
congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own 
creation.”). 
 37.  9 U.S.C. §2 (2018). The Supreme Court has held that unconscionability challenges fall within 
the meaning of FAA § 2. See Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (holding that 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to 
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2” of the FAA). 
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II. PAUL BLAND: CHALLENGING FORCED ARBITRATION IN COURT38
Public Justice (formerly known as Trial Lawyers for Public Justice) 
first represented an individual challenging the enforcement of an arbitration 
clause in 1998. In the years that followed, we would go on to win dozens of 
cases striking down unfair arbitration provisions in federal and state courts 
around the country.39 When we were not litigating these cases, lawyers at 
 38.  Paul Bland began working at Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in 1997 as a staff attorney (in 
2007, the organization changed its name to Public Justice), later becoming the Director of its Mandatory 
Arbitration Abuse Prevention Project, and in 2014 became Executive Director of Public Justice. During 
that time, he argued and litigated scores of challenges to arbitration clauses. The first appeal he handled 
was McDougle v. Silvernell, 738 So.2d 806 (Ala. 1999) (finding that an arbitration clause sent to 
homebuyers weeks after closing was enforceable). The last case he argued was A-1 Premium Ac-
ceptance, Inc. v. Hunter, 557 S.W.3d 923 (Mo. 2018) (finding that a loan contract’s arbitration clause 
precluded appointment of a substitute arbitrator for the organization named in the arbitration clause, and 
the original arbitration company named in the clause was forced to stop handling consumer arbitration 
to settle corruption allegations from state of Minnesota). In the meantime, he won numerous appeals 
challenging arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(finding that a non-party to arbitration clause was not entitled to enforce it against consumer); Lewallen 
v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2007) (lending waived right to compel arbitra-
tion); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp., 208 P.3d 901 (N.M. 2009) (one-sided arbitration clause uncon-
scionable); Toppings v. Meritech Mortgage, 569 S.E.2d 149 (W. Va. 2002) (concluding that where a 
lender’s arbitration clause designates an arbitration forum that is paid through a case volume fee sys-
tem, and the arbitration forum’s income is dependent on continued referrals from the creditor, this so 
impinges on neutrality and fundamental fairness that the clause is unconscionable and unenforceable). 
He also argued and lost some major cases. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2006) (holding that an arbitration clause was enforceable even though it was contained in a contract 
whose principal purpose was criminal under state law). He also argued and won a number of cases later 
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. See, e.g., Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Boehr), 113 P.3 1100 (Ca. 2005); Homa v. Am. Ex-
press Co., 558 F.3d 225 (3rd Cir. 2009). Bland has testified about forced arbitration in both houses of 
Congress a number of times. See S. 1782, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 50-87 (2007) (testimony 
of Paul Bland, Staff Attorney, Public Justice); Examining the CFPB’s Proposed Rulemaking on Arbi-
tration: Is It in the Public Interest and for the Protection of Consumers?: Hearing Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Fin. Inst. & Cons. Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter 
CFPB’s Proposed Rulemaking Hearing]. He has also testified about forced arbitration before various 
state legislatures. E.g., Assembly Bill No. 381, Hearing Before the Assembly Comm. on Commerce & 
Labor., 75th Sess. 24 (Nev. 2009); S.B. 645, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on General Laws & Tech.,
2020 Sess. (Va. 2020). He has fielded innumerable case intakes from consumers, workers, nursing 
home patients, small businesses and others seeking to challenge arbitration clauses; he has written 
numerous blog posts published on Public Justice’s website; among many other types of advocacy 
related to forced arbitration over the last two decades. 
 39.   See cases cited supra note 38. See also, e.g., New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 543–44 
(2019) (noting that Federal Arbitration Act’s exclusion for “contracts of employment” for certain 
transportation workers applies to both employer-employee contracts and contracts involving independ-
ent contractors); Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Container Store, Inc., 904 F.3d 70, 84 (1st Cir. 2018) (no 
arbitration agreement existed because flat touch screen interface was inaccessible to blind customers so 
they did not know a contract was being offered to them, and even for one consumer who did have 
notice, the contract was illusory because the retailer could modify the terms at any time without notice 
to consumers); Smith v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 907 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2018) (debt collector waived any 
right to enforce arbitration clause); Parnell v. Western Sky Fin. LLC, 664 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(predatory lender’s arbitration clause requiring arbitration before an arbitrator who did notexist was 
unenforceable); Messina v. North Central Distributing, 821 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2016) (employer waived 
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Public Justice filed amicus briefs ensuring that courts understood the mag-
nitude of these issues.40 And to educate lawyers about the scourge of forced 
arbitration, Public Justice attorneys made presentations at more than 100 
Continuing Legal Education programs and published numerous articles and 
blog posts.41 Our attorneys have been quoted in national and local media 
stories about the legal issues relating to forced arbitration.42 As a result of 
our litigation and amicus and educational work around these issues, Public 
Justice has become a prominent voice in the fight against forced arbitration.  
Accordingly, many consumers, workers and others who are victimized by 
these provisions have asked us for advice or to represent them. The experi-
ence of fielding and handling these thousands of intakes over the years 
informs many of the observations included in this article. 
right to arbitrate by litigating); Dang v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 673 F. App’x 779 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(consumer did not agree to arbitration clause buried in informational brochure with cell phone); Sgou-
ros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016) (website presentation did not give reasonable 
notice to consumer of arbitration clause, no agreement formed); FIA Card Servs. v. Weaver, 62 So.3d 
709 (La. 2011) (debt collector failed to meet burden of proving that consumer had agreed to arbitrate 
claims); Midland Funding LLC v. Bordeaux, 147 A.3d 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (debt 
buyer could not enforce arbitration agreement where there was insufficient evidence that the cardholder 
agreed to arbitration); Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1098 (Alaska 2009) (selective 
appeal provision unconscionable; case would only be sent to arbitration if employer would pay all 
substantial costs of arbitration); Holt v. HH Motors, 1542 So.3d 745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (arbitra-
tion clause contained in retail purchase agreement did not apply to class action); Raymond James Fin. 
Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So.2d 707 (Fl. 2005) (broker waived right to compel arbitration, even 
though investor proved no prejudice); Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC., 156 A.3d 807 (Md. 2017) 
(arbitration clause waived when debt buyer filed collection action in court before later invoking arbitra-
tion in subsequent lawsuit); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 768 A.2d 620 (Md. 2001) (reading of 
text of arbitration clause to be voluntary, not mandatory upon consumer) 
 40.  See, e.g., Brief for Public Justice, P.C., et al. as Amici Curiae, American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228 (2013), 2013 WL 417720; Brief for Public Justice & Public Good as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), 2009 
WL 3495341; Brief for Public Justice as Amici Curiae, Breazeale v. Victim Servs., 878 F.3d 759 (9th 
Cir. 2017), 2017 WL 1548959. PDFs of numerous Public Justice briefs can be found at its website, 
www.publicjustice.net (What We Do/Access to Justice/Forced Arbitration). 
 41.  Numerous blogs by Public Justice Lawyers addressing issues relating to forced arbitration can 
be found at its website. See Blog, PUBLIC JUSTICE (last visited May 4, 2020), 
www.publicjustice.net/News?blog. Upcoming presentations at CLE programs can be found on the cite. 
See Public Justice’s Speaker Series, PUBLIC JUSTICE (last visited May 4, 2020), 
www.publicjustice.net/speaker-series/. For examples of articles written by Public Justice attorneys 
addressing forced arbitration, see, for example, Sarah Belton & F. Paul Bland, How the Arbitration-At-
All-Costs Regime Ignores and Distorts Settled Law, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 135 (2014); F. 
Paul Bland & Claire J. Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 369 (2009). 
 42.  See Drew Harwell, Sterling discrimination case highlights differences between arbitration, 
litigation, WASH. POST (March 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sterling-
discrimination-case-highlights-differences-between-arbitration-litigation/2017/03/01/cdcc08c6-fe9b-
11e6-8f41-ea6ed597e4ca_story.html (quoting Paul Bland); Emily Peck, The Infuriating Reason Wells 
Fargo Got Away With Its Massive Scam For So Long, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/wells-fargo-fraud-republicans_n_57e4192be4b0e80b1ba0d583; James 
Koren, Even In Fraud Cases, Wells Fargo Customers Are Locked Into Arbitration, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 
2015), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-arbitration-20151205-story.html (same). 
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Arbitration clauses first began appearing in consumer and employ-
ment agreements in the mid-1990s, and then, their use very rapidly expand-
ed in the late 1990s and on.43 For a variety of reasons, workers and 
consumers began challenging the enforceability of arbitration clauses in 
court in the 1990s, and that litigation expanded rapidly over the years until 
at least 2011, when it began to slow.44
Early on, many of the challenges to the enforceability of arbitration 
clauses involved provisions of contracts that were not inherent to the idea 
of arbitration but rather mere unfair “bells and whistles” that some corpora-
tions injected into their arbitration clauses. While the case law was, for a 
time, divided on these points, courts eventually struck down arbitration 
clauses that (among other things) required individuals to travel long dis-
tances to arbitrate their claims,45 imposed prohibitively expensive fees and 
costs upon individuals seeking to arbitrate cases,46 gave the corporation 
exclusive control over the selection of the arbitrator,47 had other indicia of 
arbitration bias,48 or stripped plaintiffs of substantive statutory rights that 
they would normally have enjoyed and a number of other similar provi-
sions.49
 43.  Arbitration agreements had been common in the collective bargaining setting for decades but 
did not take hold in many non-unionized settings until the 1990s. See, e.g., Gilles, Day Doctrine Died,
supra note 10, at 375 (“Until the mid-1980s, arbitration had primarily served as a forum for internation-
al contract disputes and other sedate niches of the dispute resolution world.”). 
 44.  In our observation and experience, successful challenges to arbitration clauses have declined 
sharply in the wake of two U.S. Supreme Court cases. See AT&T v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 
(2011) (finding that state law policy protecting the right to collective litigation was preempted by the 
FAA); Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 80 (2010) (finding that many challenges to arbitration 
clauses should be decided by an arbitrator instead of a court). 
 45.  See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F. 3d 1257, 1292 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (hold-
ing that it was unconscionable to require California resident to arbitrate in Boston); Newton v. Ameri-
can Debt Services, No. 12-155549, 549 F. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2013) (striking down an arbitration 
clause that required California consumers to arbitrate their claims in Tulsa, Oklahoma).  
 46.  See Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F. 3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003).
 47.  Newton, 549 F. App’x at 694 (striking down a clause that gave the defendant unilateral con-
trol over the choice of the arbitrator); Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Props., Inc., 861 P.2d 1000, 1004 
(Okla. Civ. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce an agreement where the employer had sole authority to 
appoint arbitrators). 
48.  See Toppings v. Meritech Mortgage Servs., Inc., 212 W. Va. 73, 73 (2002) (concluding that 
where a lender’s arbitration clause designates an arbitration forum that is paid through a case volume 
fee system, and the arbitration forum’s income is dependent on continued referrals from the creditor, 
this so impinges upon neutrality and fundamental fairness that the clause is unconscionable and unen-
forceable) 
 49.  See generally F. PAUL BLAND, CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: ENFORCEABILITY
AND OTHER ISSUES (2003) (collecting and discussing a large number of cases where courts held that 
terms within arbitration clauses, or entire arbitration clauses, unenforceable either because they were 
unconscionable under state contract law or because they violated some other rule of state or federal 
law.) 
594 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3 
The litigation over abuses of arbitration clauses informed the public 
discussion of the broader merits of arbitration, as stories about unfair bells 
and whistles appeared in a number of press stories and were recounted and 
discussed in Congressional hearings and other forums.50 Cases where 
courts struck down these clauses as abusive and unfair were useful in high-
lighting the problem of forced arbitration. But so too were the cases where 
courts did not take action to strike down an unconscionable arbitration 
clause. Those circumstances where courts compelled arbitration in circum-
stances where most people would agree that given system was unfair also 
fueled our advocacy. In the court of public opinion, Public Justice lawyers 
were able to point to this kind of unfair decision as an indictment of the 
legal regime that enforced arbitration clauses against workers and consum-
ers.51 Accordingly, the court battles over the enforceability of arbitration 
clauses in a particular lawsuit took on a broader significance in legislative 
and public debates. 
As challenges to abuses of arbitration became more widespread (and 
often more successful) between the 1990s and 2010, many corporations 
moved towards systems that were fairer for individual litigants.52 There 
was a strong element of self-interest in this strategy: A major reason that 
many corporations have adopted arbitration clauses is to ban their workers 
and customers from bringing class actions against them.53 But where courts 
struck down entire arbitration clauses because of unfair bells and whistles, 
corporations lost the “benefit” of wiping away class actions.54 Corporate 
cost-benefit analyses clearly indicated that making their arbitration provi-
sions “fairer” overall would render them enforceable and preserve the all-
important class action ban. 
Litigation over the terms in arbitration clauses that barred workers and 
consumers from bringing class actions also greatly informed the advocacy 
around the broader debate about forced arbitration. Prior to the Supreme 
 50.  See, e.g., Testimony of F. Paul Bland, Jr. to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2007, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing examples of unfair provisions that companies 
tack onto their arbitration clauses, such as “loser pays” rules and waivers of substantive rights and 
remedies). 
 51.  See id.
 52.  AT&T Mobility “and other companies responded to the decisions invalidating first-generation 
arbitration provisions by revising their arbitration agreements to address the concerns expressed in those 
decisions.” Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 11, T-Mobile 
USA, Inc v. Laster, (2008) (No. 07-976). 
 53.  Alan Kaplinsky, Excuse me, but who’s the predator: Banks can use arbitration clauses as a 
defense, BUS. LAW. 24, 26 (June 1998) (“Arbitration is a powerful deterrent to class action lawsuits.”). 
 54.  See Newton v. American Debt Services, Inc., 549 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (striking 
arbitration clause because it required consumer to travel long distance, imposed a loser pays rule, 
among other things). 
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Court’s decisions in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds International Corpora-
tion55 and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,56 many advocates successfully 
argued that contractual terms banning class action were not inherent to 
arbitration, leading numerous courts to strike down class action bans em-
bedded in arbitration clauses.57 In a number of cases, courts traced through 
evidence that established that class action bans were effectively exculpato-
ry clauses.58 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Concepcion and American 
Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurants59 effectively ended this 
body of litigation, but the debate around class action bans accelerated. 
One significant proceeding that helped focus the national policy de-
bate on the issue of class action bans in arbitration clauses was the 2015 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) study and subsequent 
rulemaking that dealt with arbitration.60 The CFPB study concluded that 
class action bans harmed consumers by making it harder for them to obtain 
relief when they had been cheated or abused by illegal behavior.61 Signifi-
cantly, the CFPB study pointed to cases where some defendants were held 
responsible to consumers in the court system and made to pay large sums 
of damages, while in other cases, similar defendants shielded by arbitration 
clauses were not held to account for wrongdoing.62 The pre and post-
Concepcion litigation over class action bans greatly informed the agency’s 
conclusions.63
The discussion triggered by and surrounding the CFPB Study and the 
CFPB’s regulations had a substantial impact on how arbitration was 
viewed. There was an enormous amount of press coverage of the CFPB’s 
rulemaking,64 as well as the subsequent legislative debate under the Con-
 55.  559 U.S. 662, 663 (2010). 
 56.  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 57.  See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a party 
could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively 
expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement . . . .”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 
25, 37, 51 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 58.  See, e.g., Cooper v. QC Financial Services, Inc, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1290 (D. Ariz. 2007); 
Caban v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Dale v. Comcast 
Corp, 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 59.  570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013).  
 60.  See supra note 5. 
 61.  The conclusions and evidence in the CFPB’s study showing the harm of forced arbitration 
clauses to consumers is discussed in detail in Paul Bland’s house testimony. See CFPB’s Proposed 
Rulemaking Hearing, supra note 38. 
 62.  Id. at 45. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  Lauren Saunders, Will Congress Help Companies Use Forced Arbitration to Undercut Con-
sumers?, CHI. TRIB., (July 27, 2017, 4:42 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-wells-fargo-consumers-congress-perspec-
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gressional Review Act that overturned the agency’s regulation, with nu-
merous members of both houses speaking out against arbitration clauses 
that banned class actions. There was also extensive social media traffic 
discussing the CFPB study, as well as substantial Congressional debate 
focused upon the CFPB study.65 Never before had so much attention been 
focused upon forced arbitration in America. It seems likely that the sub-
stantial discussion of the CFPB regulation on forced arbitration played a 
significant role in laying the groundwork for the House of Representatives 
when it passed the FAIR Act in September of 2019. 
The public debate and the legislative battle over forced arbitration is 
likely to continue to grow in the years to come. And the experience of liti-
gation over challenges to arbitration clauses is likely to continue to inform 
these discussions. 
III. MYRIAM GILLES: THERE OUGHT TO BE A LAW AGAINST THAT. . . 
As Paul Bland and other progressive lawyers were busy challenging 
forced arbitration clauses in state and federal courts all around the country, 
members of Congress were just beginning to grasp the enormity of the 
problem. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, news outlets were reporting on 
the rise of forced arbitration clauses in credit card and bank account agree-
ments66 and other ordinary consumer transactions.67 Small businesses were 
0728-jm-20170727-story.html [https://perma.cc/J6JN-6M4Z]; David P. Cluchey, Congress Could Undo 
Rule That Makes It Easier for Financial Fraud Victims to Sue Banks, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, (July 27, 
2017, 9:01 AM), https://bangordailynews.com/2017/07/27/opinion/contributors/congress-could-undo-
rule-that-makes-it-easier-for-financial-fraud-victims-to-sue-banks/ [https://perma.cc/X8NQ-BFPA]; M. 
Sixel, Financial Firms Win Arbitration Claims More Often than Consumers, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(October 5, 2017), https://www.chron.com/business/bizfeed/article/Consumers-rarely-win-in-
arbitration-disputes-12252519.php [https://perma.cc/W866-AXK3]. 
 65.  See Editorial Board, Bad for Consumers: Congress Hands a Gift to the Financial Industry,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 1, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/editorials/2017/11/02/Bad-for-consumers-Congress-hands-a-gift-to-the-financial-
industry/stories/201711020019. See also CFPB’s Proposed Rulemaking Hearing, supra note 38. 
 66.  See Michael Ferry, Consumers: Forced Arbitration Is Bad, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 
8, 1992, at 7D (“The banks . . . are rewriting their consumer contracts, such as credit-card agreements 
and account agreements, to state that either the bank or a customer will refer a dispute to binding arbi-
tration . . . [because they] are afraid of big jury verdicts and big class actions against them. They think 
arbitrators will be less likely than juries to give customers big damage awards.”). 
 67.  See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, The Price is Rights: People Are Signing Away Consumer Pro-
tections And Many Don’t Even Know It, NEWSDAY, May 30, 1999, at F8 (reporting that a growing 
number of companies are “rewriting the fine print of their contracts and sales agreements to require that 
consumers agree, in advance, to give up their right to sue and submit disagreements to arbitrators [and 
that] [s]uch clauses also bar consumers from participating in class action suits”); Linda J. Demaine & 
Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average 
Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 n.30 (2004) (reporting that just over 55% 
“of businesses that offer an ongoing product or service” included an arbitration clause in the written 
contract). 
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complaining that they were compelled to individually arbitrate claims 
against larger and more powerful corporations involving violations of fran-
chise, antitrust and contract law.68 Even employees were increasingly sub-
ject to forced arbitration clauses as a condition of employment.69
Defenders of private dispute resolution, meanwhile, asserted that the 
less formal procedures available in arbitration were cheaper and faster, 
enabling litigants to achieve better outcomes than they could in court and 
saving companies money that would be passed on in the form of cheaper 
products and services.70 But detractors argued the opposite was true: Large 
corporations hand-picked arbitral providers who promised them “a sympa-
thetic forum,” and together, they designed “an arbitration process that 
would serve their [combined corporate] interests.”71 Arbitrator bias, critics 
argued, favored repeat-player corporations over the legitimate interests of 
consumers and employees, whose constitutional right to a jury was system-
atically denied.72
In 2007, a scandal over arbitrator bias made national news when the 
Minnesota State Attorney General announced a massive investigation into 
the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), then the nation’s largest for-
profit arbitration provider.73 The investigation ultimately revealed that, 
 68.  See, e.g., Bob Trichinelli, Bill is Aimed at Contract Abuses, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 26, 2007) 
[https://perma.cc/9557-LYDF] (reporting on franchise fraud hidden by forced arbitration clauses). 
 69.  Stephanie Mencimcer, Have You Signed Away Your Right to Sue?, MOTHER JONES (Mar.-
Apr. 2008) (reporting on employees who had been dismissed for refusing to sign arbitration clauses); 
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back 
to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 305 (2003) (“Mandatory arbitration quickly spread 
in the 1990s . . . to a wide variety of workplaces, including those with Spanish-speaking, low-wage, 
poorly educated, and minor workers.”). 
 70.  David Sherwyn, et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving 
the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 73, 105 (1999) (“[A]rbitration provide[s] the parties with an inexpensive, confidential, and fast 
resolution . . . .”); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89 (2001) (“[A]rbitration provides opportunities for a 
business to save on its dispute-resolution costs . . . .”). 
 71.  Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions on Corporate Misconduct and 
Laws Regulating Corporations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) 
[hereinafter Courting Big Business Hearing] (testimony of Elizabeth Bartholet). 
 72.  See Stephanie Mencimer, Franchise Fraud: Wake Up and Smell the Fine Print, MOTHER 
JONES (Mar.-Apr. 2009) https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/02/franchise-fraud-wake-and-
smell-fine-print/ [https://perma.cc/DV55-GBJX] (reporting on arbitrator bias and conflicts of interest); 
Eric Berkowitz, “Is Justice Served?,” L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at 20 (describing arbitration as a “pay-
for-justice phenomenon” where arbitrators are more likely to rule in favor of clients upon whom they 
depend for future business). See also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60–
61 (1997) (“[I]ndividual arbitrators have an economic stake in being selected again, and their judgment 
may well be shaded by a desire to build a ‘track record’ of decisions that corporate repeat-users will 
view approvingly.”).   
 73.  The investigation was spurred by a Public Citizen report finding that NAF arbitrators had 
ruled against consumers in 94% of cases. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT 
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while portraying itself as impartial, NAF had deep and extensive financial 
ties to credit card collection agencies; as a result, the forum ruled in favor 
of those agencies and against consumers in nearly 100,000 disputes.74 Evi-
dence also emerged that the NAF ensured its arbitrators towed the company 
line by removing those who ruled in favor of consumers.75 One arbitrator, 
Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Bartholet, told legislators that she was 
“blacklisted” from the NAF for once ruling in favor of a consumer over a 
credit card company.76 After that lone decision, the credit card companies 
decided she was too “pro-consumer” and cut her from the NAF’s roster of 
“acceptable” arbitrators.77
The NAF scandal, along with the Supreme Court’s continued embrace 
of forced arbitration, prompted the new Democratic majority in Congress to 
take action.78 In July 2007, Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin and Rep-
resentative Hank Johnson of Georgia proposed the “Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2007” (“2007 AFA”).79 The bill sought to amend Section 2 of the 
FAA to require that agreements to arbitrate employment, consumer or civil 
rights disputes be valid and enforceable only if they were made voluntarily 
CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 2  (Sept. 2007), https://www.citizen.org/wp-
content/uploads/arbitrationtrap.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3NQ-N5M7]. 
 74.  See “Arbitration” or “Arbitrary”: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer 
Debts Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy of the H. Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 111th Cong. 33 (2009) (statement of Lori Swanson, Att’y Gen. of Minn.) 
https://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM5N-Z449]. Swanson ulti-
mately filed a lawsuit against NAF, which resulted in a consent decree that barred the company from 
operating in the state. A year later, the city of San Francisco filed a similar lawsuit after it found that 
NAF had ruled against consumers in 98.9% of cases. People v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 2008 Cal. 
Super. LEXIS 8969 (No. 473-569 (March 24, 2008)). 
 75.  See Courting Big Business Hearing, supra note 71 (testimony of Bartholet) (describing efforts 
by NAF to remove her from their list of arbitrators because, in one case, she ruled in favor of the con-
sumer over the credit card company).   
 76.  See id. (concluding from her experience “that the NAF process was systematically biased in 
favor of credit card companies and against debtors” because “arbitration providers are under financial 
pressure to satisfy the corporate repeat player by systematically ruling in its favor.”).  
 77.  Id. at 4 (observing that “it seemed clear that I was being removed simply because I had once 
ruled on the merits against a credit card company, after having ruled in favor of the company numerous 
times.”). 
 78.  Prior to 2007, there had been dozens of bills introduced in Congress to limit or prohibit 
arbitration in various contexts, but 2007 marked the start of a new awareness among members of Con-
gress about the stakes involved in this debate. See Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1355 (2011) (listing federal legislative efforts to regulate arbitration 
from 1995-2010). 
 79.  See H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). Two companion bills were also introduced in the 2007 
term. First, the Fair Arbitration Act required arbitration clauses to contain certain procedural safeguards 
to be enforceable. S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1186, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill was first intro-
duced in the Senate in 2007, then was reintroduced in 2011 but died in committee both times. Second, 
the Consumer Fairness Act of 2007, which was limited to eliminating forced arbitration in standard-
form consumer contracts, was introduced in the House but failed to get a hearing. See H.R. 1443, 110th 
Cong. §1003 (2007). 
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and after the dispute had arisen.80 Initially, the 2007 AFA garnered signifi-
cant bi-partisan support: The bill was co-sponsored by 110 members of 
Congress, including five Republicans.81 For a brief moment, it seemed 
likely that federal legislation would intervene to solve the growing problem 
of forced arbitration. 
But the moment quickly passed; indeed, as soon as the House hearings 
on the bill commenced in October 2007, the ideological fault lines were 
made plain, and politicians lined up on their respective sides. The opening 
salvo was strong opposition to the 2007 AFA from the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, which asserted that passage “would severely damage an alter-
native dispute resolution system that consumers and businesses have relied 
on for decades, disrupt current commercial arbitration practices, and in-
crease litigation.”82 The Chamber also offered a litany of testimony from 
business owners, academics and others arguing that the bill would “have 
significant negative economic effects.”83 For conservatives in Congress, the 
Chamber’s message was clear: Arbitration clauses effectively eliminate 
many forms of litigation, disempowering wealthy trial lawyers and liberal 
jurists, while protecting the corporate bottom line. The 2007 AFA failed to 
make it past committee in either the Houses or Senate, and the bill would 
mark the last time that a proposed amendment to the FAA would garner 
any bipartisan support.84
In 2008, Democrats won the presidency and bolstered their majorities 
in both chambers of Congress; with political wind at their backs and 
spurred by reports that forced arbitration clauses were growing more com-
mon in light of broad judicial approval,85 progressive legislators resurrected 
 80.  S. 1782, 110th Cong. The bill was accompanied by legislative findings that “millions of 
consumers and employees [had been forced] to give up their right to have disputes resolved by a judge 
or a jury,” and that few “realize or understand the importance of the deliberately fine print that strips 
them of their rights.” Id. at §2(2). 
 81.  See H.R. 3010.  
 82.  Byron Allen Rice, The Battle of Enforceability Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitra-
tion, 27 NO. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 7 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 83.  Id. (citing Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Admin. Law of 
the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Peter B. Rutledge)). 
 84.  While the bill was sent to both the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Subcommittee 
on the Constitution, neither committee issued a report, and the bill never came to the floor for a vote. 
See S. 1782.  
 85.  See, e.g., Forced Arbitration: Unfair and Everywhere, PUBLIC CITIZEN 1 (Sept. 14, 2009), 
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/unfairandeverywhere.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB5P-B4JP]) 
(reporting that over 75% of companies, including credit cards, banks, and cell phone providers, imposed 
arbitration on their consumers or employees); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Sol-
diers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 886 (2008) (finding mandatory arbitration clauses in 93% of the employment 
contracts and 77% of the consumer contracts). See also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 
(2009) (upholding arbitration of Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims in union contracts). 
600 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3 
the AFA.86 The 2009 Arbitration Fairness Act (“2009 AFA”) was nearly 
identical in language to its predecessor, and it suffered the same demise. By 
this point, congressional Republicans had fully internalized the Chamber’s 
talking points that arbitration was cheaper, faster, and better for consumers, 
reduced “frivolous” litigation, and sidelined unscrupulous lawyers.87 Ac-
cordingly, the hearings on the 2009 AFA featured partisan grandstanding 
rather than policymaking.88 With the battle lines drawn, the bill garnered 
the support of 117 Democrats in the House – but only 1 Republican – and 
never made it past committee in either chamber.89
By 2010, however, the landscape had shifted considerably. The Leh-
man Brothers crash in late 2008 sent stocks plummeting, sparking the worst 
economic recession in nearly a century.90 Many attributed the crisis to a 
lack of government oversight and regulation of financial institutions, which 
led to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010.91 Among the Act’s complex legislative reforms 
was the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), 
which was instructed to study and report to Congress on the impact of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts.92 Democrats 
clearly anticipated that the CFPB would ultimately promulgate regulations 
banning forced arbitration, but first, the statutorily-mandated study would 
take five long years to complete. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continued to expansively interpret the 
FAA, emboldening corporations to impose ever-more onerous terms in 
 86.  The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). Democrats also 
introduced a companion bill, The Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, H.R. 1237, that 
sought to eliminate pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home admissions contracts.   
 87. Voters Strongly Back Arbitration, New Poll Shows, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Apr. 1, 
2008), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/voters-strongly-back-arbitration-new-poll-shows. 
 88.  See, e.g., Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is It Fair and Arbitrary?: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 111th Cong. (2009); Workplace Fairness: Has the Su-
preme Court been Misinterpreting Laws Designed to Protect American Workers from Discrimination?:
Hearing before the Comm. on the S. Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 89.  Representative Steven LaTourette of Ohio was the sole Republican in favor of the 2009 AFA. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, congress.gov [https://perma.cc/BG2J-4HHZ]. 
 90.  Ben Chu, Financial Crisis 2008: How Lehman Brothers Helped Cause “the Worst Financial 
Crisis in History,” INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 2018) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/financial-crisis-2008-why-lehman-
brothers-what-happened-10-years-anniversary-a8531581.html.  
 91.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481-5603 
(2018). 
 92.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1028(b) (2010); 12 USC § 5518(b). The Act also 
provided that the CFPB might promulgate rules to regulate the use of forced arbitration in contracts 
within its purview. Id. (providing that the Bureau could “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on 
the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a 
prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of 
consumers.”). 
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their standard-form arbitration clauses.93 The coup de grace was the 
Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T v. Concepcion.94 Consumers filed a class 
action against AT&T, alleging fraud in the marketing and sale of cell 
phones; in response, the company moved to compel arbitration based on a 
clause in the service contract that accompanies every new mobile phone 
purchase.95 Both the California district and the Ninth Circuit found that 
AT&T’s arbitration clause, which required consumers to waive their class 
action rights, was unconscionable under California law.96 In a 5-4 decision 
authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 
FAA preempted “state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the FAA’s objectives.”97
The Concepcion decision was immediately and intensely controver-
sial. Critics complained that the conservative Justices had eliminated the 
only tools available to consumers and employees to fight abusive business 
practices.98 As the Court’s holding began to “spread from the consumer 
milieu to high-stakes claims under employment law” and other areas, calls 
for Congressional action grew more insistent.99 Less than two weeks after 
Concepcion was decided, Senators Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal, 
along with Congressman Hank Johnson, reintroduced the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act (“2011 AFA”), which sought to reverse the Court’s decision by 
prohibiting waivers of class actions in all consumer, employment, and civ-
il-rights-related contracts.100 Yet, despite the public outcry over Concep-
cion and the growing concern that valid claims were “slip[ping] through the 
 93.  See Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) (concluding that challenges 
to the enforceability of a contract containing an arbitration clause rest with the arbitrator). 
 94.  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 95.  Id. (describing procedural posture). 
 96.  Id.
 97.  Id. at 351. 
 98.  See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the 
Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 491 (2011) (“Following 
Concepcion, remedies for consumers with low value claims will no longer be available through the 
judicial system. Thus, consumers and their advocates must turn to Congress for assistance with this 
major concern.”). 
 99.  Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers,
107 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2019) (internal citations omitted). See Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html 
[https://perma.cc/62PF-KHHV] (calling on Congress to legislatively overrule Concepcion); Amalia 
Kessler, Stuck in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2012, at A27 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/opinion/stuck-in-arbitration.html [perma.cc/8WBT-RYA7] 
(observing that “Congress has repeatedly failed to step in and fix this system.”). 
 100.  See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong., § 1 (2011). 
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legal system,” the hyper-partisan atmosphere in Washington was no more 
receptive to this corrective legislation than its precursors.101
Two years later, in American Express Company v. Italian Colors Res-
taurants, the Supreme Court again enforced a class-banning arbitration 
clause imposed in a standard-form credit card acceptance agreement; this 
time, its ruling prevented small businesses from banding together to vindi-
cate their rights under federal antitrust laws.102 And once again, Democrats 
in Congress reintroduced the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 (“2013 
AFA”).103
When the Senate Judiciary Committee scheduled hearings on the 2013 
AFA for December 17, 2013, I was invited to provide testimony on the 
impact of class-banning forced arbitration clauses on the claims of con-
sumers, employees and small businesses.104 I can still recall the excitement 
in the Chamber that morning; it was my first time testifying before Con-
gress and after a decade of writing about forced arbitration, I felt so strong-
ly that a federal statutory solution was the only hope. Perhaps I was one of 
the few who entered the room believing that the bill could finally become 
law—a feeling that dissipated over the course of the hearing itself. The 
politics were so evident—Democrats on the side of litigation before public 
courts and juries, Republicans on the side of corporations and “freedom of 
contract.” But even as we left the Senate building that winter day, advo-
cates were buoyed by a feeling of growing momentum and engagement on 
the issue. People were beginning to pay attention, and change was coming. 
But the 2013 AFA, like each version before it, died in committee after 
securing only twenty-four co-sponsors in the Senate and seventy-one in the 
House—all Democrats, no Republicans.105 Indeed, subsequent versions of 
the AFA were reintroduced in 2015 and 2017; each offered up in response 
to the latest Supreme Court decision upholding forced arbitration or public 
scandal involving arbitration and each failing to marshal enough support to 
make it to a vote on the House or Senate floor.106 In 2017, for example, 
 101.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351. See Editorial, supra note 99, at A26 (noting that the chances of 
federal legislation overriding Concepcion “aren’t great in the current political environment.”). 
 102.  570 U.S. 228, 238 (2013). 
 103.  S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). In direct response to the Italian 
Colors decision, the 2013 AFA prohibited forced arbitration in consumer, employment, civil rights 
cases and antitrust disputes. 
 104.  The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
Undermine the Rights of Consumers, Workers and Small Businesses?, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
15 (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113shrg89563/pdf/CHRG-
113shrg89563.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2KH-QPSD].  
 105.  S. 878. 
 106.  See generally H.R. 1844; Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(enacted); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).   
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reports surfaced that Wells Fargo employees had been opening fraudulent 
accounts using their customer’s private information.107 But when customers 
tried to sue, their claims were shunted into private arbitration, allowing the 
company to keep the fraud out of the public eye for years.108 Ultimately, 
around 2 million fake accounts were opened, and even when the scandal 
became public, Well Fargo continued to hide behind its arbitration 
clause.109 Convinced as ever that the threat of private litigation would have 
deterred this widespread misconduct, Congress again tried and failed to 
pass the AFA.110
But even as Congress failed to rally support for legislation, public 
awareness and outrage over forced arbitration grew.111 Weary of legislative 
battles that went nowhere, advocates began to lobby the executive 
branch—a strategy that proved hugely successful in the short-term. In 
2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order barring federal agencies 
from entering into agreements with companies that force their workers to 
arbitrate claims for sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination.112 That 
same year, Attorneys Generals from sixteen states and the District of Co-
lumbia urged the federal government to deny Medicaid and Medicare mon-
ey to nursing homes that use these clauses; a year later, the Department of 
 107.  Emily Flitter, The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal Grows by $3 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/business/wells-fargo-settlement.html 
(describing scandal involving sham accounts).   
 108.  See, e.g., Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowly, Wells Fargo Killing Sham Account Suits by Using 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), nytime.com/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-killing-
sham-account-suits-by-using-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/T25Z-CAYV] (reporting that the bank 
“has sought to kill lawsuits that its customers have filed over the creation of as many as two million 
sham accounts by moving the cases into private arbitration.”).  
 109.  Michael Hiltzik, No Surprise: Wells Fargo Is Leveraging Its Arbitration Clause to Win an 
Advantageous Scandal Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017, 4:45 PM), 
latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wells-settlement-20170331-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GQ2S-42AB]. 
 110.  S. 537, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill received support of only 26 Senators and 82 
Representatives – all Democrats.  
 111.  See, e.g., Editorial Board, A Tool Consumers Need, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/30/opinion/a-tool-consumers-need.html [https://perma.cc/R2R6-
8UM4] (chronicling the rise of force arbitration); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitra-
tion Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-
ofjustice [http://perma.cc/QA9T-Z26P]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-
justicesystem [http://perma.cc/6EN5-CUZM]; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Reli-
gious Arbitration, Scripture is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-
of-law.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/V7PG-L7KF]. 
 112.  See Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 13,673, § 6(a) (July 31, 
2014). 
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Health and Human Services issued a rule barring federally-funded nursing 
homes from forcing residents to sign arbitration clauses.113 In quick succes-
sion, numerous federal agencies promulgated area-specific rules banning 
arbitration clauses and class action bans.114
Finally, in 2015, the CFPB issued a 728-page report chronicling the 
deleterious effects of forced arbitration on consumers and promulgated 
regulations prohibiting these provisions in consumer financial contracts.115
But once President Trump was elected in 2016 and Republicans regained 
control in both chambers of Congress, the strategy of banning forced arbi-
tration via regulation began to unravel. In March 2017, President Trump 
repealed President Obama’s Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Or-
der.116 A few months later, the Department of Health and Human Services 
reconsidered its opposition to arbitration clauses in nursing home admis-
sion contracts, calling them “advantageous to both providers and benefi-
ciaries because they allow for the expeditious resolution of claims without 
the costs and expense of litigation.”117 Other agencies quickly followed 
suit, abandoning the “anti-arbitration rules they had inherited.”118 Finally, 
on October, 24, 2017, the Senate voted 51 to 50 – with Vice President 
Pence casting the tie-breaking vote – to repeal the CFPB’s rule prohibiting 
class-banning clauses before the rule could take effect.119
That late-night vote was a heart-breaking moment for advocates and 
Democrats in Congress. Efforts to enact curative legislation would eventu-
ally resume, particularly in the wake of the #MeToo movement and grow-
ing evidence that arbitration clauses had shielded sexual predators from 
 113.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Just Made It a Lot Less Difficult to 
Sue Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2016, at A1 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/business/dealbook/arbitration-nursing-homes-elder-abuse-
harassment-claims.html [https://perma.cc/K2WZ-X8T8].
 114.  See, e.g., Department of Labor (DOL), Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), 
“Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary;’’ Conflict of Interest Rule” 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, (Apr. 8, 2016) 
(“[P]rohibit[ing] pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements with respect to individual contract 
claims.”); Department of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 685.300(e)-(f) (2018) (precluding forced arbitration 
for certain allegations against schools that receive Title IV assistance under the Higher Education Act). 
 115.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9; see also Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 
33,210 (July 19, 2017); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Agency Moves to Allow 
Class-Action Lawsuits Against Financial Firms, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2017), ny-
times.com/2017/07/10/business/dealbook/class-action-lawsuits-finance-banks.html 
[https://perma.cc/XW4R-YE7R]. 
 116.  See Exec. Order No. 13,782, § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607 (Mar. 30, 2017). 
 117.  Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 99, at 18 (internal citations omitted). 
 118.  Id.
 119.  Jessica Silver Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-wall-street-
regulation.html?searchResultPosition=4 [https://perma.cc/J3V7-TST2]. 
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responsibility,120 and are ongoing to this day. As of this writing, the Forced 
Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (“FAIR” Act), which would prohibit pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate employment, consumer, antitrust and civil 
rights claims, has passed the House of Representatives but again, appears 
unlikely to gain traction in the Senate.121
* * *
In a recent decision upholding forced arbitration clauses in employ-
ment contracts, Justice Gorsuch surveyed the limited legislative exceptions 
to the FAA and observed “Congress has shown that it knows exactly 
how . . . to override the [FAA].”122 To some extent, Justice Gorsuch is 
right: Over the past fifteen years, Congress has responded to the problems 
of class-banning forced arbitration clauses by enacting a handful of very 
narrow, highly specific carve-outs for particular groups of people or con-
texts.123 In doing so, its members have shown an awareness of how unfair 
these provisions can be, but the body still has not managed to secure the 
necessary votes for a broad legislative fix. If anything, the issue of class-
banning forced arbitration has grown only more ideologically polarized 
with each new Congressional session.124 The well-resourced Chamber of 
Commerce has used its influence (and campaign contributions) to repel 
repeated efforts to amend the FAA, even as polls show that the vast majori-
ty of Americans believe that consumers and employees should have the 
right to go to court and be heard by a jury of their peers.125
By now, there really ought to be a law. 
 120.  Gretchen Carlson, How to Encourage More Women to Report Sexual Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/opinion/women-reporting-sexual-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/3USJ-XXAW] (writing that when a woman’s “employment contract 
includes an arbitration clause, she’s likely to have signed away her right to a jury trial.”). 
 121.  See FAIR Act, H.R. 1073, S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2019). 
 122.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1617 (2018). 
 123.  Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1226(a)(2) (2018) (prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts between car manufacturers 
and dealers); Military Lending Act, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2018) (prohibiting forced arbitra-
tion clauses in consumer credit agreements with active military personnel); Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act of 2008, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197(c) (2018) (prohibiting forced arbitration in livestock and 
poultry contracts); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017) 
(prohibiting federal contractors from forcing employees to arbitrate Title VII claims); 5 U.S.C. § 
1639c(e)(1) (2018) (prohibiting forced arbitration in residential mortgage contracts). 
 124.  See, for example, Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017), as a 
Republican-led effort to eliminate most forms of class action litigation.   
 125.  GUY MOLYNEUX & GEOFF GARIN, HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., National Survey on Required 
Arbitration, (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.justice.org/sites/default/files/2.28.19%20Hart%20poll%20memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GV5N-CZMW] (demonstrating that 83% of Democrats and 84% of Republicans 
polled strongly believe that consumers should have a choice between court and arbitration). 
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IV. TANUJA GUPTA: HOW THE NON-LAWYERS CAN FIGHT BACK
In the season finale of The Morning Show, Billy Crudup’s character 
seemed to reach through the TV and answer the question that had been 
rolling around my head: After nearly 9 years, with new stories of sexual 
harassment and gender discrimination breaking too frequently to track, did 
I really want to stay at Google?  Billy grabbed my shoulders and looked me 
squarely in the eye, “[y]ou cannot keep yourself pure just by moving on 
every time someone disappoints you. You think people in one town over 
are gonna be any better? No. Human nature, it’s surprisingly universal, and 
it’s universally disappointing, so you might as well stay and fight the 
fight.”126 I suspect that impulse to “fight the fight” was what led 20,000 
Google employees to walk off the job on November 1, 2018 in protest of 
Google’s sexual harassment policies. And that same drive is why the ma-
jority of my colleagues continue to tussle with our company’s leadership to 
this day. 
I was sitting in a meeting when I first learn of the New York Times ar-
ticle that would spark the Google Walkout.127 In many meetings, Googlers 
multitask by answering emails or chats as they listen to the conversation in 
the session. No less guilty of this terrible practice, I received a chat ping 
from my colleague John who is sitting across from me. I looked at him in 
surprise and then clicked the link he sent. I scanned the article to find that 
the “father of Android” Andy Rubin received a $90 million payout when he 
left Google, despite credible allegations of sexual misconduct. And then I 
went back to answering my other emails. 
In our office ten minutes later, John mused, “I thought you would be 
more upset by this news?” I closed the door to our office and proceeded to 
tell him about my own experiences with sexual harassment and gender 
discrimination at Google. I reminded him that we live in an era when a man 
can face twenty-five credible accusations of sexual assault and still be 
elected president,128 when another man just weeks ago had been confirmed 
 126.  Jackie Strause, ‘Morning Show’: Billy Crudup Reveals Inspiration Behind ‘Shape-Shifter’ 
Network Exec, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 13, 2019, 6:41 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/apples-morning-show-billy-crudup-interview-cory-
finale-season-2-1262376 [https://perma.cc/V8C7-AVNF]. 
 127.  Daisuke Wakabayashi & Katie Benner, How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the ‘Father of 
Android’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/google-
sexual-harassment-andy-rubin.html [https://perma.cc/MBN5-97SV]. 
 128.  Eliza Relman, The 25 women who have accused Trump of sexual misconduct, BUS. INSIDER
(Oct. 9, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/women-accused-trump-sexual-misconduct-
list-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/TLL5-HZ68]. 
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to the Supreme Court despite a questionable temperament about potential 
sexual misconduct. 
Nothing much happened until Monday, October 29th around 8:00 PM. 
As I checked my work email, I saw a thread called “Women’s Walk” post-
ed to an internal forum for New Yorker Googlers with two emails from 
earlier in the evening. One email contained a link to a Buzzfeed article 
about the walkout asking, “is this happening in NYC”?129 Someone re-
sponded with a link to another post on a different internal forum with a 
document proposing HR policy changes to Google leadership, including 
the idea of a walkout from fellow Googler, Claire Stapleton.130
Finally, I started to feel what John had likely been expecting from me. 
I pinged Claire on gChat and told her that I would organize the NYC 
walkout event, setting up a time to meet the following day. By 11 AM the 
next day, I was working with coordinators across 50 offices to organize 
logistics for walkouts across all the Google offices. 
Suddenly all the tools and practices I use to run an engineering pro-
gram in my career became incredibly useful for organizing a global protest 
around company misconduct. I created an internal site that racked up 
34,000 views over the next four days, where local organizers could down-
load rally scripts, logos and press kits. Googlers could share their stories 
and experiences with harassment via a Google Form (which I scrubbed for 
any personally identifiable information before posting). 
Most importantly, on this website, colleagues could learn more about 
the “demands” of the walkout.131 By this time, the walkout was much more 
than just anger at one particular executive; it was the culmination of years 
of gender, racial and economic inequity at this company coming to a head.  
The goals of the walkout were to drive change in a number of areas that all 
contribute to the structural imbalance of power. A demand to end our com-
pany policy of mandatory arbitration was at the top of the list. 
In spite of the ubiquity of mandatory or “forced” arbitration provi-
sions, most Americans have never heard of them. No high school govern-
ment or civics curriculum covers this arcane procedure because forcing 
 129.  Caroline O’Donovan & Ryan Mac, Google Engineers are Organizing a Walkout to Protest 
the Company’s Protection of an Alleged Sexual Harasser, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/googles-female-engineers-walkout-sexual-
harassment [https://perma.cc/TT8Z-J6QY]. 
 130.  See Claire Stapleton, Google Loved Me, Until I Pointed Out Everything That Sucked About It,
ELLE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.elle.com/culture/tech/a30259355/google-walkout-organizer-claire-
stapleton/ [https://perma.cc/L7UJ-6MMA]. 
 131.  Claire Stapleton et. al., We’re the Organizers of the Google Walkout. Here are Our Demands,
THE CUT (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/11/google-walkout-organizers-explain-
demands.html [https://perma.cc/PBX7-8TS6]. 
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arbitration on employees is not law. It is the circumvention of law. And in 
the private sector, large corporations take advantage of these provisions to 
squelch workers’ claims of harassment, discrimination, wage theft, retalia-
tion and more. As the resident layperson in this article’s byline, here is how 
it works from an employee’s view: You get harassed by your manager and 
report him to Human Resources. HR starts to investigate your claim and in 
asking your coworkers and others questions, inevitably tips off your man-
ager to the complaint.  Suddenly, you find yourself left out of meetings or 
dropped off emails, impacting your ability to do your job well. Any higher-
up who you try to tell backs away quickly from the conversation, encourag-
ing you to work with your HR rep, the very person who tipped off your 
manager in the first place. In your performance review, your manager low-
ers your ratings because your work has suffered, and you are “encouraged” 
to find a new team; except no team will take you with poor ratings and 
eventually, you are let go. You meet with an employment lawyer because 
you realize what happened to you was not just about a single bad manager 
who preys on women, but how those in power (HR, VPs, colleagues) all 
contributed to your firing and made it hard for you to find work again, leav-
ing you without an income. 
But then your lawyer asks if you signed away your right to sue the 
company. You blink curiously. No, I would never sign such a thing. Except 
most of us have. In fact, 60 million US workers in the private sector have 
signed away this right and agreed to resolve issues like these through 
forced arbitration.132 When you ask your lawyer what the chances are of 
winning in this process, your lawyer gives you the odds, and then politely 
declines to take the case because even if you do win, the dollar amount of 
the award would barely cover the legal fees. So, you drop it all together 
because you do not have time or money to hold your employer accountable 
while searching for a new employer. And the pattern of harassment contin-
ues for the next victim. 
What happened on the day of the walkout and the following weeks is 
well documented in the press. 20,000 Googlers walked out across fifty 
cities, starting from the Asia-Pacific region and finally ending at the moth-
ership campus in Mountain View, California.133 The following week, 
Google indirectly responds to the demands by offering to make arbitration 
 132.  Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 
2, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-
courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/ [https://perma.cc/J5T8-PFEM].
 133.  Google walkout - Mountain View - Nov. 1, 2018, VIMEO (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://vimeo.com/298574248 [https://perma.cc/HZ6H-RHWP]. 
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optional but only in individual cases of sexual assault and harassment.134
This sounds like progress, but our organizing group sees right through it. 
First, Google offered no insight into their calculus of how claims like 
sexual harassment can go to court but not others like racial discrimination. 
Second, claims could be inextricably linked to one another, like in the case 
of my colleague Loretta Lee, who sued Google for wrongful termination, 
which she believes occurred because she reported sexual harassment.135
With Google’s new policy, a case for harassment would go one way, and a 
case for retaliation would go another way. Lee’s lawyer Richard Hoyer 
assessed the policy change best: “That doesn’t make any sense for any case 
I’ve ever taken in 27 years . . . [n]obody wants to make two lawsuits out of 
one.”136 And third, since only individual cases could go to court, employees 
could not band together to form a class action lawsuit. It is the most anti-
MeToo change Google could make. 
So, at this point, the walkout seemed to have prompted nothing more 
than public relations from the company, rather than actual change. Google 
took a victory lap in the press, and the next day, Facebook, Airbnb and 
eBay all make the same hollow gesture.137 To some, the walkout appears 
successful, but arbitration is still forced for cases of discrimination, wage 
theft and retaliation. And internally, the organizing group dynamic began to 
shift. 
When relative strangers come together in two weeks to spark a protest, 
they skip the necessary effort it takes to build a network of trusted partners 
that agree on how to handle setbacks, the roles of different organizers or 
the levels of risk that each person is willing to take. A group can fall apart 
just as quickly as it comes together if it lacks a shared understanding of 
long-term viability, identity and constituency. While email threads and 
video conference calls helped us do something that may have taken years in 
 134.  Sundar Pichai, A Note to Our Employees, GOOGLE (Nov. 8, 2018) 
https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/note-our-employees/ 
[https://perma.cc/59QL-TP6M]. 
 135.  Davey Alba, A Google Lawyer Said Its Sexual Misconduct Policy Change “Does Not Apply 
Retroactively To Claims”, BUZZFEED, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/google-
lawyer-says-sexual-misconduct-policy-change-does-not [https://perma.cc/TV4R-VYLP]. 
 136.  Nitasha Tiku, Tech’s New Harassment Policies Are Too Late for Some Women, WIRED (Nov. 
11, 2018, 8:39 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/techs-new-harassment-policies-late-some-women/ 
[https://perma.cc/7NVF-4M3F]. 
137 See, e.g., Didi Martinez, Facebook, Airbnb and eBay join Google in ending forced arbitra-
tion for sexual harassment claims, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:18 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-airbnb-ebay-join-google-ending-forced-arbitration-
sexual-harassment-n935451. 
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the past, they also could not replace some of scaffolding that comes only 
with time. 
To this day, I have never met three of the other global walkout organ-
izers face to face, much less the local leads in other offices. The four white 
women organizers left the company within a year of the walkout, while the 
three people of color remain.138 And we have all had different approaches 
to how or who should court the press. And if you think race is not a factor, 
think again. Now, when people at other companies ask how they too can 
organize a walkout, I first ask, “what’s your goal and how far are you will-
ing to go?” I point them to the resources that I wish I had read first and 
encourage them to talk to the people that I wish I had listened to more in-
tently during the leadup to November 1st. 
By December 2018, with the holidays fast approaching, the group was 
unclear on next steps or which demands to chase. A handful of us splin-
tered off to focus on ending forced arbitration. We refused to squander the 
momentum and publicity of the Google Walkout without making a real 
dent on the issue of mandatory arbitration; not to mention, our CEO was 
about to  testify before the House Judiciary Committee and we believe this 
was a chance to hold Google publicly accountable for its worker poli-
cies.139 Our rationale for picking arbitration as the top issue was that we 
could not have an honest conversation about gender or racial inequity if we 
could not even understand the number of claims being swept under the rug 
due to forced arbitration. Plus, arbitration was the only specific policy that 
had a piece of looming federal legislation that could change working condi-
tions for all workers.140
We started small, with organizers from New York, Boston, Seattle and 
San Francisco. We confirmed our mission: to end forced arbitration for all 
our colleagues.141 We set up our communications structure on Medium, 
Twitter and a dedicated website. We scheduled weekly video conference 
calls on Tuesdays at 10 PM EST, with all communication conducted off the 
corporate infrastructure and outside of normal work hours. We established 
point-people for each area, designated which members are willing to be 
138 See Nitasha Tiku, Most of the Google Walkout Organizers Have Left the Company, WIRED
(July 16, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/most-google-walkout-organizers-left-
company/.
 139.  Rep. Pramila Jayapal (@RepJayapal), TWITTER (Dec. 11, 2018, 1:27PM), 
https://twitter.com/repjayapal/status/1072573550186381312?lang=en [https://perma/cc/7CV7-TVFK]. 
 140.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 141.  End Forced Arbitration, 2019 Must be the Year to End Forced Arbitration, MEDIUM (Dec. 10, 
2018), https://medium.com/@endforcedarbitration/2019-must-be-the-year-to-end-forced-arbitration-
f4f6833abef7 [https://perma.cc/RMG4-TsSD]. 
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public and talk to press, and which prefer to remain anonymous. We punted 
on important questions like how we would pay for things or how we would 
handle any issues around using Google in our name (i.e., “Googlers for 
Ending Forced Arbitration”) without authorization, opting to figure the rest 
out as we go. For now, we focused on a three-pronged strategy to get what 
we want. 
A. Education 
Aside from getting more Americans to care about the arbitration le-
galese in their contracts, we also had to re-rally our own Google colleagues 
about the issue. We first had to dispel the myth that Google ended arbitra-
tion with their initial walkout response and then show why forcing arbitra-
tion is unfair to workers. We launched educational campaigns on social 
media to explain the practice.142 We published essays to refute common 
talking points.143 We brought in experts for a panel session where legal 
scholars like Myriam Gilles, Kathy Stone and Alexander Colvin explained 
the perils of forced arbitration to 800 of our colleagues. Holidays and 
weekends soon became time to shoot and edit video that tell the stories of 
numerous victims. We posted all this content on www.endforcedarbitration 
for people to share what they learn with others. 
B. Coalitions 
However, we were not the only ones educating. We also enlisted the 
help of professors, lawyers, activists and survivors outside of Google for 
guidance on how to be good allies in this fight. One contact connected us to 
another and another, and soon we had a rolodex of people who had been 
fighting forced arbitration far longer than we have. Lawyers from top firms 
around the country and activists from labor protection advocacy groups 
reviewed our content for accuracy, helped us to interpret recent court case 
rulings and navigate the impacts of growing state legislation efforts. But 
the most educational and humbling meetings were with the survivors of 
forced arbitration. 
142 See David Ingram, Google employees launch campaign to end all forced arbitration, NBC
NEWS (Jan. 15, 2019, 2:23 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/google-employees-launch-
campaign-bring-discrimination-issues-out-shadows-n959016.
143 See End Forced Arbitration, The Bipartisan Case for Ending Forced Arbitration, MEDIUM
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://medium.com/@endforcedarbitration/the-bipartisan-case-for-ending-forced-
arbitration-485f73eeb635.
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And I use this term “survivor” intentionally. Heather and Ellen sur-
vived, not only the assaults by their managers at Sterling Jewelers, but the 
humiliation of begging the justice system for two years for the right to 
bring their claims to light. After failing to convince a court to strike down 
the arbitration clause in their employment contract, these women spent a 
decade fighting for justice in arbitration.144 Tara Zoumer knew WeWork 
was trouble long before the rest of us when she was fired for refusing to 
sign her forced arbitration agreement. In fact, she was the first to be sub-
poenaed by the California state legislature to tell lawmakers about what 
happened to her at WeWork.145
As our education efforts grew with the guidance of these workers, 
more people started coming forward to join our coalition. After one of our 
social media campaigns, Peter and Glenda Perez reached out via Twitter 
direct message. They had both lost their jobs at Cigna and believed that the 
company was engaged in a pattern of racial discrimination; then, they faced 
the further humiliation of seeing their “impartial” arbitrator arm in arm 
with the lawyer from Cigna. We produced a video for the Perez family to 
share their story and set up a GoFundMe to help with their kids’ expens-
es.146 Through Google Alerts, I received notifications of new cases, which 
is how we learned about the systemic harassment that Karen Ward suffered 
at Ernst & Young147 and how the luxury-brands company Louis Vuitton 
Moet Hennessy promoted an executive who thrust his genitals in employee 
Andowah Newton’s face, while forcing that employee to arbitrate her 
claims of sexual misconduct.148 As we learned about these employees who 
had been victimized and silenced by forced arbitration, we realized that we 
 144.  Drew Harwell, Hundreds allege sex harassment, discrimination at Kay and Jared jewelry 




 145.  Melody Gutierrez, Unmuzzled by Legislature’s subpoena, Bay Area woman backs workers’ 
rights bill, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Apr. 24, 2018, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Unmuzzled-by-Legislature-s-subpoena-Bay-Area-
12861013.php [https://perma.cc/6P3U-S8NT]. 
 146.  Tanuja Gupta, Peter & Glenda Perez – End Forced Arbitration, GOFUNDME (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://www.gofundme.com/f/peter-amp-glenda-perez-end-forced-arbitration [https://perma.cc/DG8M-
6BH7]. 
 147.  Emily Peck, She Spoke Up About Sexual Harassment at Ernst & Young and got Caught in a 
Web of Retaliation, HUFFPOST (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ernst-and-young-
sexual-harassment-karen-ward_n_5c14080ee4b009b8aea73086 [https://perma.cc/42VG-FFLB]. 
 148.  Emily Smith, LVMH Says Legal Exec’s Sexual Harassment Claims are ‘Meritless and Frivo-
lous’, PAGE SIX (May 20, 2019), https://pagesix.com/2019/05/20/lvmh-says-legal-execs-sexual-
harassment-claims-are-meritless-and-frivolous/ [https://perma.cc/9H8J-CYB8]. 
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had to tell these stories – not just to the public – but to the elected officials 
who represent the public. 
C. Legislation 
One final coalition was yet to be built. While some members of Con-
gress are quite aware of forced arbitration, others are new and have yet to 
take a stance on the matter. Two weeks after the walkout, the House Dem-
ocrats introduced a bill into Congress called the Restoring Justice for 
Workers Act.149 We also learned that Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) 
would soon be re-introducing the Arbitration Fairness Act but with a new 
much catchier title in early 2019. 
By this time, it was clear that Google would not be changing its stance 
anytime soon, so we began planning a trip to DC. Our goal was to share the 
stories we had learned and to ask members of Congress to support legisla-
tion that ends forced arbitration at the federal level. Google had very strict 
ethical policies on how employees can interact with members of govern-
ment or bring politics into the workplace. So we knew that any lobbying 
time would need to be taken as vacation days, any meetings we requested 
with members of Congress could not be obtained by using Google’s brand, 
and that we would have to be careful not to become leverage for elected 
officials in their own political agenda against Google. 
We cautiously started reaching out to our own elected officials and 
asked for meetings to talk about the issue, explaining that we were organiz-
ers of the Google Walkout and our goal was to end forced arbitration in all 
workplaces. We consulted the American Association of Justice to under-
stand which members of Congress would be most open to hearing our sto-
ries. Responses ranged from instant acceptance to total silence. We took 
any meeting we can get, whether with an elected official or a sympathetic 
legislative assistant. When Senator Blumenthal’s office learned that we 
were coming to D.C., staffers asked us to help introduce the new legislation 
under its new name (the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, or the 
“FAIR Act) at the February press conference. 
We started to suspect that word of our trip had leaked to the Google 
policy liaisons. Our suspicions were confirmed when, one week before our 
trip, a staffer in a Congressperson’s office forwarded me the note that 
Google sent her boss: 
 149. Alexia F. Campbell, House Democrats Have a Sweeping Plan to Protect Millions of Workers’ 
Legal Rights, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018), https:/www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/11/14/18087490/mandatory-arbitration-house-democrats [https://perma.cc/QL4B-LM99]. 
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Hi there. Hope you’re well. 
As you know, last year we made some changes to how we handle 
various workplace issues, including making arbitration optional for 
individual sexual harassment and sexual assault disputes. Since then, 
we have been focused on understanding the full landscape and the 
options available in this space. Today, our SVP of Global Affairs, 
Kent Walker, let employees know that the company will no longer 
require current and future Google employees to arbitrate employment 
disputes. This article (https://www.vox.com/2019/2/21/18235161/ 
google-workplace-dispute-end-forced-arbitration) covers some of the 
details of the change. 
I know many of you have been deeply invested in this issue and we 
wanted to share this update. Please let us know if you have any ques-
tions or comments. Thanks. 
At 4:32 PM that same day, all Google employees received an email 
from VP Kent Walker with the update that Google has ended forced arbi-
tration for all current and future employees for all issues. 
Overnight, the tone of our trip changed. We transitioned from tech 
workers railing against our company’s policies to the best press agents that 
Google could get. It felt as if Google wanted us to say, “Look, our compa-
ny ended forced arbitration, so should you!” We were suddenly lacking a 
battle to fight, but only because we already won it. Not to mention, the 
fight to end forced arbitration seemed bigger than a policy change at one 
company. We wanted this for all companies now, so the Heathers and El-
lens and Glendas and Peters and Karens and Taras and Lorettas and 
Andowahs of the workforce would never be forced into arbitration again. 
We wanted all the temps, vendors and contractors who make up half of the 
workforce at Google, but do not enjoy the rights of employees, so150 we 
continued with our trip to D.C. and helped introduce the FAIR Act into the 
2018-2019 Congressional docket.151
This was the first of six trips to Washington D.C. in 2019. We talked 
to anyone and everyone who would listen, stumbling through our first 
meetings and getting lost on the Hill. But soon, the process felt like second 
 150.  Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google’s Shadow Work Force: Temps Who Outnumber Full-Time 
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/technology/google-
temp-workers.html [https://perma.cc/6TSB-DGAB]. 
 151.  Emily Birnbaum, Google employees join lawmakers pushing bills to end forced arbitration,
THE HILL (Feb. 28, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/432065-lawmakers-
introduce-bills-to-end-forced-arbitration [https://perma.cc/NA7M-JH8Q]. 
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nature. The meetings varied in success. For some of the freshmen members 
of Congress, whose staff had never even heard of the FAIR Act, it was 
important to just explain the issues so they could be comfortable with co-
sponsoring the bill. For others, they cited delicate ties to businesses that 
force arbitration and worried about their re-election prospects. No amount 
of explanation moved the needle in these meetings. We followed the lead 
set by the American Association for Justice, attending committee hearings 
and supplying evidence material when they request it. We supported other 
groups in their efforts to meet with Congress, such as the Harvard law stu-
dents at the People’s Parity Project;152 and we connected with workers at 
other companies like Riot Games when they protested forced arbitration in 
their workplaces.153 And when we were not physically in D.C., we orga-
nized phone banks to flood legislators with calls about the issue.154
On September 20, 2019, the FAIR Act passed in the House.155 Our 
group celebrated with the hundreds of people who had been working on 
this victory, vowing to use the Fall for planning how we would meet with 
each Senator until we could get the bill through the Senate. In the midst of 
impeachment hearings and other disasters, we still planned to do whatever 
we could to move the needle in 2020. 
But the story of Googlers to End Forced Arbitration did not wrap up 
with a celebration on the steps of Congress. Instead, two months later, 
Google fired four employees who were also organizing around labor issues, 
namely the company’s work with Customs & Border Patrol.156  One of the 
engineers that was fired sat 10 feet away from me in the New York office. 
He and I would often trade tips on how to organize. We would sign each 
other’s petitions and field questions from other Google employees who 
wanted to get involved. The firings shaked our entire group, comprised of 
parents with kids in school and mortgages to pay. Not to mention, the toll 
 152.  About Us, PEOPLE’S PARITY PROJECT, https://www.peoplesparity.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/X535-PR3B]. 
 153.  Samantha Masunaga, Riot Games Keeps Requiring Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Cases, 
Despite Protest, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-riot-games-
arbitration-sexual-harassment-discrimination-20190517-story.html [https://perma.cc/377Y-33HA]. 
 154.  End Forced Arbitration, Googlers for Ending Forced Arbitration share phonebank feedback, 
fellow organizers . . . and the flaw in Google’s refusal to end forced arbitration for Suppliers, MEDIUM
(May 3, 2019), https://medium.com/@endforcedarbitration/googlers-for-ending-forced-arbitration-
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of the year started to weigh on me, and I wondered how much longer I 
could keep up these two full-time jobs. 
So, we started to re-evaluate. We looked at the risks we had taken and 
wondered if and when Google will decide to go after us. We considered 
when our faces needed to be front and center versus when we could organ-
ize behind the scenes. We thought about the mundane things, like how 
often we tweeted, and the larger tasks, like how we should continue to visit 
D.C. And we thought about all the survivors we had met along the way. We 
decided two things: We needed to lower our public profile, and we were 
not done yet. 
CONCLUSION
Changing law is time-consuming, arduous work. It requires deep 
stores of patience, commitment and tenacity. Frankly, it requires a dose of 
good fortune. Each of us has tried to change the law by challenging forced 
arbitration in a variety of contexts, and this essay is an effort to tell these 
stories of legal transformation-in-the-making. Needless to say, our side has 
suffered more losses than victories: As of this writing, forced arbitration 
clauses remain broadly enforceable and ever-more commonplace. We may 
have chipped away at its most egregious forms and spotlighted its worst 
abuses, but we have yet to defeat the idea of forced arbitration. We have 
yet to successfully petition a majority of Congress to enact a federal law 
banning these provisions or convince a majority of Supreme Court Justices 
that forced arbitration violates basic notions of due process, denying citi-
zens access to justice and the right to a jury of their peers. The corporatist, 
hyper-partisan politics of this era have stalled progress on this issue, even 
as the majority of Americans express strong opposition to forced arbitra-
tion.157
Nonetheless, each of us has also experienced small and important vic-
tories: an organized employee walkout, followed by months of sustained 
activism, that forced a major tech company to abandon its forced arbitra-
tion clause and led other companies to follow suit; powerful legal argu-
ments that compelled courts to strike down unconscionable arbitration 
clauses; testimony that has sought to hold congressional leaders accounta-
ble for the harmful effects of forced arbitration on their constituents. And 
we are not alone: There are many other groups of lawyers, activists, legal 
scholars and policymakers at both the state and federal level who challenge 
 157.  See GUY MOLYNEUX & GEOFF GARIN, supra note 125 (showing that 84% of voters—87% of 
Republicans and 83% of Democrats—support legislation to end forced arbitration). 
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these provisions at every turn. Our shared experiences, both the failures and 
the successes, reflect a fundamental truth about movements to transform 
legal doctrine—namely (to paraphrase Margaret Mead), it only takes a 
small group of thoughtful, committed citizens to change the world; indeed, 
it’s the only way meaningful change has ever come about. As the battles 
over forced arbitration continue to rage—as they surely will—each of us 
will continue to play our part in bringing about the transformative legal 
change of ending forced arbitration and restoring jury rights. 
